Same global energy shock, sharply different domestic fuel price pass through
Tracking credible data from the National Petroleum Authority’s (NPA) price floor series, from the pre war period in February 2026 to the second September pricing window, Ghana’s ex pump petrol price rose from GH¢10.24 to GH¢16.00 per litre, an increase of GH¢5.76 or 56.3%. Diesel rose from GH¢11.34 to GH¢16.77 per litre, representing an increase of GH¢5.43 or 47.9%.
The reality is, however, markedly different across the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). WAEMU comprises eight countries: seven Francophone countries, Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo, and Portuguese speaking Guinea Bissau. The eight countries share a common monetary framework under the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO).
Across the eight countries, the same period recorded an average fuel price increase of just 9.2% for petrol and 13.7% for diesel. In other words, the increase in Ghana’s petrol price was approximately 512% higher than the WAEMU average, while the diesel increase was approximately 250% higher. Put differently, the WAEMU petrol price increase was about 83.7% lower than Ghana’s, while the diesel increase was about 71.4% lower.
The contrast becomes even more striking when individual countries are examined.
Burkina Faso recorded no increase in petrol prices over the period, despite producing no crude oil and relying on imported petroleum products. The IMF confirms that Burkina Faso is exposed to the global oil shock precisely because of its dependence on imported petroleum products. Yet its policy framework has absorbed a substantial portion of the shock through subsidies and regulated pricing.
Niger provides an even stronger example. Its administered fuel prices have remained unchanged since October 2024, meaning consumers have not faced a corresponding pump price adjustment during the latest global energy shock. But the shock has not disappeared. The Nigerien state has absorbed part of it through implicit and explicit subsidies. The IMF estimates the combined cost of these fuel subsidies at 0.6% of GDP in 2026, comprising 0.3% of GDP in implicit subsidy and another 0.3% in explicit subsidy.
This brings us to the real policy question: when an international energy shock arrives, how much of it should the consumer be required to absorb immediately, and how much should the state cushion?
That is where the policy differences become important. The IMF notes that fuel price pass through has been limited in some WAEMU countries because of regulated petroleum prices and long term pre purchased fixed price oil contracts. Burkina Faso, for example, has deliberately used energy subsidies to cushion consumers, although the IMF stresses that such subsidies need to remain targeted and temporary because they carry fiscal costs.
The second important distinction is monetary architecture. Ghana operates its own monetary system under the Bank of Ghana, whereas the eight WAEMU countries share the BCEAO, a common central bank responsible for common monetary policy and the monetary framework of the union. This provides an additional layer of regional monetary and exchange rate stability, although it is important not to attribute the entire difference in fuel price movements to the BCEAO alone. The pricing regime, subsidies, import contracts, taxation and exchange rate arrangements all matter.
The bigger lesson from the data is therefore straightforward: the global oil shock may be common, but the way governments choose to transmit that shock to households is not.
And that is ultimately a question of policy: when the price of energy rises sharply, who takes the hit, the consumer, the government, or a combination of both?
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Abonenga Joseph Aguyire
Economic Policy and Development Strategist
Social Commentator | Political Activist
Email: Mysirjoe10@gmail.com
